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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DIAMOND 'r li"fAH, INC., et al.,
\
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Th~~d Party
Plaintiff, a n d Respondent
and Cross Appellant.

Case No. 9284

vs.

UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS,
LONDON,
Third Party Defendant and
Appellant.

I

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENTS
FACTS
Respondent shall refer to the parties and pages in
the record and transcript as designated in Lloyd's brief,
and to Shennan N. Drain and John A. Drain, doing
busines~ as D. L. & ,-v·. Transport Company, as the
Drains, and Roy G. James as the broker.
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rrhe Drains purchased a truck from Diamond ~,
Utah, Inc. under a conditional sales contract, which was
sold to Utah Savings and Trust Company, now Zions
First National Bank. The recourse provision of the contract provided that upon delinquency in payments, the
contract would revert to Diamond T. During the course
of the contract the Drains were delinquent, and Diamond
'1, was reinstated as the loss payee.
The Drains purchased a physical damage and a
partial liability coverage insurance policy from Roy G-.
James, 'vho placed the insurance through Stephen W.
Netolicky of Surplus Lines Company, an agent for Canal
Insurance Company. The Drains paid $209 on the accident policy (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8), and no payment 'vas
made on the liability policy. The balance of the policies
'vere to be financed by the insurance company (T. 78,
87, 106).
Canal alleges that in the 1neantime the home office
of Canal had notified Surplus Lines that unless they
could 'vrite the full liability coverage, it 'vould be necessary to cancel the existing policy ( T. 15). Canal's agent,
Stephen \V-. Netolicky, and secretary, Sandra Redding,
testified that on :\lay 1-±, 1958, notices of cancellation,
cancelling the policy ten day~ fron1 the date of the
noticP:s, "Tere mailed to the insured Sher1nan N. Drain,
the loss payee as sho,vu on the policy Zions First N" ational
Bank, and the broker Roy G. J an1es. ~Ir. X etolicky further testified that the policy 'vas being cancelled for
nonpa~''lnent, and this 'vas conveyed to the broker a
nluuber of ti1nes in oral conversations (T. ±6). :Jir.
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Netolicky testified that he could not remember if he
told the broker to have the insured send the premiu1n
in, even though the cancellation notices had been sent
out (T. 46).
rrhe insured, upon being orally informed by the
broker that the policy was not financed, and that it
\Vas to be cancelled, paid an additional $239 on May
:28, 1958 (T. 106 - Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9), making a
total of $4:-!S paid by May 2S, 1958 on the physical damage policy, the liability policy, and some bonds, all
policies taking effect in April, 1958, and were to run
for a year, for a total premium of approximately $837
(T. 81). The broker testified that after the May 28 check
,,·as sent in, Surplus Lines was no longer billing him
for premumis due on the policy, indicating that the
policy was paid-up-to-date ( T. 122).
The insured, Sherman N. Drain, Mr. Grant B. Bryan
representing Zions First National Bank, and the broker
Roy G. James, all testified that they did not receive a
notice of cancellation of the physical damage policy
allegedly sent out by Surplus Lines (See Point I). On
cross-examination counsel attempted to break down Mr.
James' testimony, but was unsuccessful. The broker did
~tate that he had had a number of conversations with
~lr. N etolieky concerning the possible cancellation if
the premiun1 \\·as not paid, and had received a letter
stating that it \vould be necessary to cancel the policy
if the premiun1 \Vas not paid (T. 102, 103, 106). He
further testified that he did receive a notice of the cancellation of the liability policy, and indicated that the
insured did, too (T. 123).
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Appellants attempt to make this out as notice of
cancellation of the physical dan1age policy, but the Court
should note that if it were the physical damage policy,
then the loss payee, Zions First National Bank, \vould
also have received a notice. However, since there is no
loss payee on the liability policy, ~lr. Bryan would not
receive a notice, which is the case here.
Surplus Lines, to the date of the trial, had made
no attempt to refund the premium paid on the aleged
cancelled policy, yet on June 30, 1958, a Inonth after the
May 28 payment was made, when the Drain vehicle was
involved in an accident, the Canal Insurance Company
attempted to assert that the policy was cancelled.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
POLICY OF INSURANCE ISSUED BY CANAL INSURANCE
COMPANY WAS NOT CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE
OF THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE
AS TO PREMIUM PAYMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENTS
AFTER THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED CANCELLATION,
AND THAT CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY WAS ES'TOPPED TO PROVE CANCELLATION.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE
RESPONDEN'TS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND
PRE- TRIAL ORDER TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL.
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ARGUl\fENT
POINT I.
THE COUR'T DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
POLICY OF INSURANCE ISSUED BY CANAL INSURANCE
COMPANY WAS NOT CANCELLED PRIOR TO THE DATE
OF THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF.

The trial court, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 76), and its amended findings and conclusions (R. 86), found the following:
"14. That the aforesaid Insurance polir~~
was in full force and effect at the time of the
accident, and had not been cancelled prior
thereto;"
"14-A. That the testimony of the witness,
Mrs. Sandra Redding that she mailed the Notices
of Cancellation to the named insured, and to the
loss payee named on the ~Canal Insurance policy,
is true, and that said witness did, in fact, mail
said Notices, as testified by her.''
At first glance there appears to be some inconsistency between the t\\~o statements, and 'Canal so contends
on page 12 of its brief. The respondents' position is that
they are consistent, and the Court did not intend to
modify fact X o. 1-:.1, for the Court only found that the
testimony of Sandra Redding, that the notices were
mailed, was true, but did not find that the notices were
received by the addresses; that the policy was in force
and effect at the date of the accident because (1) the
notices were not effective as to form (Point I); and
(2) that Canal 'yas estopped from claiming they were
mailed and that the policy \\'"as cancelled (Point II).
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The insurance policy, in paragraph 13 of the conditions,
provides:
" * * * this policy rnay be cancelled by the
Company by mailing to the insured at the address
shown in this policy, written notice stating when
not less than 10 days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing of notice as
aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice. The
time of the surrender or the effective date and
hour of cancellation stated in the notice shall
become the end of the policy period. Delivery
of such written notice, either by the insured or
by the Company shall be equivalent to mailing."
(Ex. 1).
The testimony, as g1ven by the insured, the lienholder, and the broker, as found in the transcript and
set out in detail on pages 20 and 21 of third party appellant's brief, is to the effect that the notices were
never received by them. The insured, Sherman N. Drain,
testified:
''Q. Did you ever receive a notice of cancellation~

A.

No, sir I did not.

Q. On any of the policies involved~
A. No, sir, I never received any cancellation." ( T. 78, 79).

"Q. You had no no tire from anyone concerning eancellation J?
A. No, sir." (Tr. 79).
l\f r. Grant G. Bryan, repre~enting Zions First Nat i onal Bank, the lienholder~ ~aid :
"Q. I sho"'" yon '""hat has been marked Exhibit 2, and I 'Yill ask you if you ever received
6
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a cancellation notice, which that would be a copy
of, cancelling the policy which has been marked
Exhibit 1, which you have~
A. No, sir, I do not recall receiving any .
thing like that.

Q. Did you receive any kind of a cancella.
tion notice on that policy~
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you receive any notice by telephone
or otherwise, to the effect that the policy had
been cane Piled ?
A. No, sir." (T. 93).
0

The broker, Roy G. James, who sold the policy to
the Drains, stated:

Q. I show you what has been marked Exhibit 2 \vhich purports to be a notice of cancellation of insurance policy, and I will ask you if you
ever received a notice that would be a copy of.
A. I don't recall receiving this type of
notice of cancellation in connection with this
policy.
Q.
type

Did you say you did not receive that

notice~

A. Yes, I can say I did not receive this
type notice." ( T. 102)
As to the question of 1nailing and receiving notices,
the Court, in the case of Paz. v. lmplen1ent Dealers
Jfutual Ins. Co., 89 S. 2d 514, held:
"'Of course, the presumption is that a letter
properly addressed and deposited in the United
States post office is received by the addre;;;see,
but that presumption is rebuttable."
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.The only notice that was ever received was notice
that the liability insurance, which was a separate policy,
was going to be cancelled (T. 123). The question of law
before this Court is whether the notices, as sent out
but never received, were effective to cancel the insurance
policy. A very complete and comprehensive annotation, which covers most phases of this subject, is found
in 64 ALR 2d 982. Under a cancellation provision identical with the cancellation provision in the ·Canal policy,
which is referred to as standard cancellation clause, the
annotation on page 1000 provides :
"Where the socalled 'standard cancellation
clause' has been involved, a decided conflict in
the decision exists regarding the question whether
actual receipt of the cancellation notice mailed by
the insurer constitutes a prerequisite to the cancellation of the insurance. A majority of the
decisions have held that the actual receipt of the
cancellation notice by the insured is not a condition precedent to the cancellation of the insurance
by the insurer, providing the oancellation notice
itself contains a fixed date on which the cancellation is to becorne effective, * * * " (Emphasis
supplied)
The Ininority rule holds that the receiving of the
notices i8 a condition precedent to the cancellation of a
policy. 6-:l- .A.LR ~d 978, 1012. The n1ajority rule is not
without Inodifieation for it is recognized by all courts
discus~ing this question that the notice of cancellation
rnust agree in every particular \Yith the cancellation
provision of the policy, and any ambiguity \Yill be strictly
construed in favor of the insured. 64 ALR :2d. 990.
8
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Canal, on pages 23 to 25 of its brief, provides the
following on this subject :
•' * * * It i~ equally well settled that a cancellation notice, to be effective, must be clear,
unconditional and unequovical, and that any ambiguities in it will be resolved in favor of the
insured, and against the insurer. In 6 Couch
Cyclopedia of Insurance La\v, Sec. 1442, page
5098, it is said:
'l)rovisions for cancellation in an insurance poliey must be strictly followed to effect
that result. * * * The principle that underlies the decisions is that a party is precluded
from destroying the existing contract rights
except upon a strict observance of the reservations contained in the contract itself, or
some statute, or by agreement with, or waiver
of his rights by, the other party. But in the
absence of waiver or estoppel it is generally
agreed that a notice of cancellati on to the
insured must be clear, unconditional and
unequivocal, and that a mere expression of
a purpose or intention to cancel in the future
is not sufficient; that is, it must be one of
actual cancellation, not of future conditional
cancellation, or of doubtful meaning as to
time or pnrpose.' Emphasis by Canal)
1

"The same author says at page 5100:
'Furthermore, notice to cancel, must be an
actual one \vithin the terms and meaning of the
policy, it not being sufficient to state merely an
intent to cancel upon compliance or noncompliance, as the case may be, with some condition; it must so unequivocally inform insured as
to leave no doubt on his part that his policy will
expire at the end of the period limited within
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the terms of the policy, and that insurer's liability
under the contract will then cease.' (Emphasis
by Canal)
"See also § 1406, p. 5021.
"In 29 Am. Jur., 733, Insurance, Sec. 383, it is said:
"See also § 379, pp. 730-731.
''In Volume 6, Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4185, it is said:
&

'Such notice must be expressed in positi~;e,
clear and unequivocal terms. A notice must be
in accordance with the policy provisions, and
must be explicit, premptory, and ttncondi,ti'onal,
so that the insured will not be left in doubt as to
the expiration date of the policy.' (Emphasis
by Canal)
"And in Lindy v. Lilitz Mutual Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 1,
100 SE2d 544, the court said:
'While notice of cancellation need not be in
any particular form, it must be of sueh character
as to positively and 1l nequit:ocally indicate to the
insured that the Company does not intend longer
to be bound by the contract. * * * Any antbiguity in the notice 1nust be resolved in favor of the
Assured.' (Emphasis by ·Canal)
"See also Chanl!Jcrs v. lr'ashington vlat. Ins.
Co., (Ga. App.), 17 SE2d 899, and Medford v.
Pac1"fic National Fire Ins. Co., (Ore.), 219 P. (2d)
142."
In defendant's Exhibit :2~ ·w·hich is the notice of canePilation, it sets forth that the policy '\Tas mailed on
1\fa~r 1-t-, 1958, but does not provide a definite cancella-

10
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tion date, thus failing to comply with the italicized portion of the majority rule as set forth on Page 8, and with
the policy canee llation provision. It does state :
The effective date of cancellation shall be
five ( 3) days after service of this notice"
4

'

Ineaning that the policy will be cancelled five days after
the happening of a future event, the future event being
the service of thi~ notice. The event never took place;
therefore, the polie:T could have never been legally
cancelled.
The insurer chose the method of cancellation and
set the condition subsequent or future event that would
start the five days to run. Now he should not be allowed
to complain of his own choice of action of not following
the policy provision, but should be bound by his choice.
In the case of Bretoer v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
245 S\\r2d 532, an insurance policy contained a cancellation provision identical 'vith the Canal cancellation
clause, and the co1npany sent a cancellation notice "rhich
stated: ''said cancellation to be effective five day after
receipt of this notice." The court held that it was not
an effective cancellation unles~ actually delivered to the
insured, stating:
"The 'vritten notice did not fix a date certain for """hich the cancellation 'vas effective, and
the insurer had a 'vide choice of many times and
dates for the effective cancellation moment. The
notice here, instead of fixing a definite time, the
arrival of which ""ould be the definite cancellation date, selected an uncertain time to become
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

the terms of the policy, and that insurer's liability
under the contract will then cease.' (Emphasis
by Canal)
"See also § 1406, p. 5021.
''In 29 Am. J ur., 733, Insurance, Sec. 383, it is said:
"See also § 379, pp. 730-731.
''In Volume 6, Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Sec. 4185, it is said:
'Such notice 1nust be expressed in positive,
clear and unequivocal terms. A notice must be
in accordance with the policy provisions, and
must be explicit, premptory, and 11;nconditional,
so that the insured will not be left in doubt as to,
the expiration date of the policy.' (Emphasis
by Canal)
"And in Lindy v. Lil·itz Mutual Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 1,
100 SE2d 544, the court said:
'While notice of cancellation need not be in
any particular form, it must be of such character
as to positively and unequivocally indicate to the
insured that the Conzpany does not intend longer
to be boun.d by the contract. * * * Any anzuz~q
uity 1·n the notice rnust be resolved in favor of the
Assured.' (Emphasis by ,Canal)
''See also Chanz.bcrs v. Trashin_r;ton Nat. Ins.
Co., (Ga. App.), 17 SE~d 899. and 1lledford v.
Pacific 1\Tational Fire l1zs. Co., (Ore.), 219 P. (2d)
14-~."

In defendant's Exhibit 2_. "Thich is the notice of canePilation, it sets forth that the policy \Yas mailed on
nla~r 14, ln38, but does not provide a definite cancella10
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tion date, thus failing to comply with the italicized portion of the majority rule as set forth on Page 8, and with
the policy eane0llation provision. It does state:
''The 0ffective date of cancellation shall be
five ( 5) days after service of this notice"
meaning that the policy will be cancelled five days after
the happening of a future event, the future event being
the service of this notice. The event never took place;
therPfore, the policy could have never been legally
cancelled.
The insurer chose the method of cancellation and
set the condition subsequent or future event that would
start the five days to run. Now he should not be allowed
to complain of his own choice of action of not following
the policy provision, but should be bound by his choice.
In the case of Breu:er v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
2-t-5 s,-r2d 53~~ an insurance policy contained a cancellation provision identical with the Canal cancellation
clause, and the co1npany sent a cancellation notice "rhich
stated: ''said cancellation to be effective five day after
receipt of this notiee." The court held that it was not
an effective cancellation unless actually delivered to the
insured, stating :
"The \Yritten notice did not fix a date certain for \vhich the cancellation \vas effective, and
the insurer had a \vide choice of many times and
dates for the effective cancellation moment. The
notice here, instead of fixing a definite time, the
arrival of \vhich would be the definite cancellation date, selected an uncertain time to become
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fixed by the happening of a future event. That
event was the 'receipt of this not~ce by you.'
From and after the occurrence of that event, the
insurer, by its written notice, would commence
to compute a period of five days, and at the end
of those five days, after the happening of the
event chosen, the policy would be cancelled. * * *
It cannot be argued that the policy provisions
will control over the written notice which, it is
claimed, had an incorrect date for cancellation.
The date selected by the insurer in the notice is
not an incorrect date or inconsistent with the
policy provision, since the policy permits the
insurer to select its own cancellation date provided it is not less than five days after mailing.
It can choose such time thereafter as it desires.
Hence, we do not have an incorrect date in the
notice of cancellation, but 've have a date that
the policy permits the insurer to choose. With
a policy that so permits, appellee cannot be
heard to claim that the policy beean1e canceled
at a date earlier than its own notice fixed. The
object of such notice is to inform the insured so
he may obtain new insurance if he desires. To
give effect to appellee's argument \vould be to
permit the insurer to inform the insured of one
cancellation date but cancel his policy at an
earlier and different date." (E1nphasis by Court)
The question came before the Supreme Court of
Colorado in the case of II art.forcl Fire Ins. Co. v. Brothe,
262 P. 927, \vhere the cancellntion clause provided "upon
r<'cPi pt of this notice." The Court held:
~'The

sen tenre in the letter relative to the
tin1e ",.hen the cancellation \Yould be effective
1nn~t be regarded as defendant's O\vn construction of the policy. The defendant had the right,
under the policy, to na1ne any date or time sat-

12
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isfactory to itself when the the cancellation should
take effect. It saw proper to inform plaintiff
that the eancellation of the policy would be effective upon receipt of that notice. By that it is
bound."
In the case of Paz v. lnzplement Dealers Mutual
Ins. Co. (supra), a state insurance statute provided, in
essence, that cancellation may be effected by mailing
of notice not lt>ss than five days prior to the date of
cancellation. The insurer sent notices to the effect:
'"from the receipt nf this notice". The Court held that
the mailing of notices in compliance with the statute
would cancel the policy, but then stated :
'~However,

the defendant chose to do more
than the statute required, that is, the effectiveness of the notice, with respect to cancellation
of the policy, after being mailed to the plaintiff
by the defendant, was further predicated on the
actual receipt thereof by the plaintiff."
See also lV crner v. Com1nontvealth Casualty Co., 160 A.
547; Kamille r. Honze Fh·e & Marine Ins. Co. of Californz~a, 221 N.Y.S. 38.
The ho1ne office of Canal Insurance Company realized that the policy 'Yas never cancelled, and that cancellation \\?as predieated upon the happening of a future
event, for in plaintiff's Exhibit 4, which is a letter from
Canal Insurance Company to its agent Surplus Lines
Co1npany, they state:
"\Y. e are returning the material you sent us

in connection with cancellation of the captioned
policy and \\""ish to advise this does not constitute
evidence of cancellation.
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''Also, we are enclosing another copy of our
-Underwriting Rules & Regulations which we
believe you should review thoroughly."
The home office, by its own admission, never recognized
that the policy was cancelled. As the record state, the
home office returned their notice of cancellation to
Surplus Lines so there would be nothing in their office
to show that the policy was cancelled (T. 68). At the
trial no evidence was introduced that further affirmative action was taken toward the cancellation, yet the
company now is contending that the policy was cancelled,
a position wholly inconsistent, unjustified and unethical
for an insurance company to take under the facts of this
case, and this Court should strike it down.
The question may arise as to what is the definition
of ''service of this notice." The Supreme Court of New
York, in the case of Mass v. P. A. Trucking Co., 134
N.Y.S. 2d, 393-395, 'vhere a claim 'vas filed for workmens' compensation insurance, the defense being that
cancellation notices had been mailed, held that:
''The statute directs that 'no contract of insurance issued' for "\vorkmens' co1npensation liabilitY 'shall be cancelled' unless notice be served
on the employer. * * * Service must be personal
service or service made by registered mail. The
exact language of the statute prohibits cancellation unless 'notice' is 'served'. This require1nent
has had a literal construction."
The case of Conzpania De.Llstral S. ~~!. v. Boston Jletals
Co., 107 A ~d 3;)7, in quoting fron1 Corbin on Contracts,
stated:
''But "\Yhen, by the ter1ns of an already eon-

14
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sununated contract, it is provided that one party
shall have the power to produce certain legal
results by giving notice, it is usually held that
this means notice received in fact and not merely
notice mailed * * * .''

Gates v. (iates, 144 A. 2d, 782-785:
·~The

word 'service' in its technical sense,
has a distinct and well understood meaning in
legal practice, and as applied to writs and other
instruments, it means to deliver; to deliver in
such a manner as to charge the person with the
receipt of it; to deliver with judicial effect; to
file; to give."
From this we see the words •'service" and "receipt''
seem to be somewhat synonymous. Therefore, the case
at hand would fall directly within the rule as laid down
by Brewer v. Maryland Casualty Co.; Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Brothe; and Paz v. Implement Dealers Mutual Ins.
Co.
In the case of Baldwin v. Fi.delity Phenvx Fire Ins.
Co. of 1\r.Y., 260 Fed. 2d, 951-954, ·w·here the policy required that notice to be given of an accident, and the
insured mailed it in, the Court held :
'• X otice is knowledge or information legally
equivalent to knowledge, brought home to the
party notified in immediate connection with the
subject to which the notice relates. It is not,
therefore, the sending, but the receipt of, a letter
that will constitute notice."
The proof of mailing was not sufficient. Canal had
to actually sho\\T that the notice \vas served on the insure(l. or received by the insured. Thi~ they completely
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failed to do. In fact, they didn't even attempt to. They
had to be received by the insured himself, and the receiving by the agent, secretary, or wife is insufficient. The
only evidence as given by Mr. N etolicky and Sandra
Redding 'vas that the notices were mailed. This does
not comply 'vith the provision chosen by the insured in
the cancellation notice.
Canal understood the burden placed upon it in defending its action, for on page 23 of its brief, it states:
'·It is well settled that cancellation is an
affirmative defense, and the party asserting it
has the burden of proof. Trans-Amerioa Ins. Go.
v. Wilson, 263 Ala. 532, 80 So. 2d 253."
Also, in the case of Paz v. Implement Dealers Mutual
Ins. Co., supra, the Louisiana Court held:
"It is fundamental that the insurer must
successfully carry the burden of establishing the
facts which limit or relieve its liability."
We submit that the appellants have failed to meet
this burden~ that the cancellation notices were never
received by the insured, the lienholder, or the broker;
that the notices "-ere improper as to form to effectuate
the cancellation of the poliry; that the hon1e office, by
is o"'"n admission, never recognized the policy as being
canee lied; that the trial court did not err in finding that
t hP polic~- 'vas in full force and effect at the time of the
loss sustained by the insured, and it should be upheld
1)~"

this Court.

16
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POINT II.

•

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE
AS TO PREMIUM PAYMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENTS
AFTER THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED CANCELLATION,
AND THAT CANAL 1NSURANCE COMPANY WAS ES'TOPPED To· PROVE CANCELLATION.

The issue before the Court, as set forth in the pretrial order, was '~whether or not the insurance policy
in question was in force and effect on the date of the
loss, to-wit: June 30, 1958" (R. 41). The issue was not
limited to whether the cancellation notices had been
mailed, whether they had been received, whether Canal
'vas estopped from asserting cancellation, or whether
the policy had been cancelled for nonpayment of premium, but was broad enough to include all of these. This
is evident from the opening statement of the Court and
counsel as found on pages 5 and 6 of the transcript:
THE COURT:***
~Ir.

Wilkinson, since he has the burden of
going forward what are your objections to his
proposed evidence~ In other words, what will
be the issues~
MR. WILI{INSON: We take issue as to the
mailing of any notice. We claim they were not
mailed.
THE ·COURT: They were not mailed'
~IR.

WILKINSON: Yes, :po notices were
received; that the notice which they purport to
have mailed, does not meet the requirements of
the policy, and that Surplus Lines, as agent for
Canal Insurance Company, accepted money on
the policy premium - on the policy, after the
date they claim it was cancelled.
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• THE COURT: What does that have you claim they waived notice¥

do

MR. WILKINSON: We claim, by receiving
this money, they waived their notice, and also
that this is proof that no notice was actually
mailed out to the defendant.
THE COURT: So another issue, you claim
will be they waived it~
MR. WILKINSON: Yes, that is right.
THE COURT: Or cancelled it, or something."
The Court, 1n admitting evidence of payments by
the Drains, after the notice of cancellation had been
sent out, did not err for it realized that such evidence
was material to the broad issue before the Court. The
testimony and findings were to the effect that the policy
was to be cancelled for nonpayment of premium (T. 47 R. 86). The insureds were expecting to have the premium financed by the insurance company (T. 79, 87, 106),
but upon their heing informed orally by the broker that
it was not financed, and that it "~as going to be cancelled for nonpayment, they paid the amount due (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9). 'Vhen the payment 'Yas retained by
the company, it reinstated the policy and waived the
nonpayment cancellation (T. 46). The la",. is not in
dispute on this subject, and I refer the Court to 29-A
Am. J ur. Insurance, St r. 1081, 'Yhich states:
1

"It is "'"ell settled that the insurer's acceptance of a premium after the time 'vhen it should
have been paid, but before a loss has occurred, is
a "'"aiver of the forfeiture which might have been
18
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enforced because such premium was not paid
when due." (See cases cited)
The company had a duty to return the prennum
and inform the insured that cancellation notices had
been sent out and the policy was being cancelled. Instead, they kept the premium, causing the insured to
rely on the action of the company, of retaining the premium, to drive the vehicle thinking it was insured, when
it was not, thus causing the insured to rely on the action
of the ·Canal to their detriment.
This complies with the ele1nents of estoppel as set
forth in 19 Am. Jur., p. 642, and set out in cross appellants' brief on pages 15 and 16, and the case of Migliacco
v. Dav£s, 232 P. 2d, 195, cited in third party appellants'
brief, and the theory of estoppel as set forth on page
19 of their brief, to-wit:
''To establish an estoppel, plaintiff must
prove that they had no knowledge of the true
facts and reasonably relied on Canal's activities
to their detriment."
The whole argument of Lloyds on pages 19 to 22
failed to take into consideration the fact that the broker
and ~Ir. Xetolicky had a number of conversations concerning the nonpayment of the premium, and this was
told to the insured by the broker, but the insured had
no kno\\~ledge of the cancellation notices. Even if the
Court found that the insured had received a notice of
cancellation, the holding of estoppel \vould be the same,
for the agent, ~Ir. K etolicky, denies that he told the
broker not to have the insured send the premium in
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(T. 46). The information conveyed to the insured was
"send the premiu1n in and all will be fine", thus the
insured, without a knowledge of the true facts, relied
on the action of Canal to their detriment.
The general rule of law is that if a policy is legally
cancelled, that it is not necesary to return the premium
paid until a reasonable time thereafter, but this rule is
limited to premiums paid at the time of cancellation.
It does not go so far as to say that it is not necessary
to return a premium paid subsequent to the cancellation notice. In effect, the appellants would contend you
can cancel a policy, but retain future payments. Canal,
on page 11 of its brief, after citing the case of J en.s.en
v. Traders & General Ins. Co. 345 P. 2d. 1, states:
"The Court further held that the mere fact
that premiums were paid after the effective date
of cancellation, and that unearned premiums were
not returned to the insured, was not sufficient to
viti~ate the cancellation."
We submit that this is not the correct holding of
this case for the Court does not say that the premiums
were paid and retained after the August 10, 1951 cancellation date. The Court states, on page 2:
"All premiums "\\7ere paid from l\iay 1951
through November 1951."
The Court, in the previous trial of the sa1ne case, at
2!1G P. 2d +:1+-~t-:37~ footnote 3, provides:
''There "Tas sufficient evidence that the full
amount of the premimu on this policy for the
year for "'"hich issued (April 19, 1951 to April
20
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19, 1952) had been paid to defendant's agent
Lotz by Moschetti and Vader, the firm that sold
the car to DiMatteos, and obtained the policy for
them."
From this we see that this case merely upholds the
general rule and does not give us any law as to whether
the insurance company is entitled to a cancellation if
they retain futre payments. Again, on page 16 of Canal's
brief, it states:

'''Ve have been unable to find any similar
cases where it has even been contended that a
policy of insurance, once cancelled, can be revived by the simple expedient of sending in a
premium payment."
This statement may be true, but apparently from the
lack of authority cited, they are unable to find any cases
that take the position that a cancellation notice takes
effect even if the insurance company retains payments
sent in after the date of the notice. The authorities on
this point are very sparse, but for a \vell settled rule,
\vhen insurance companies are estopped to claim forfeiture I refer the ·Court to 29-A Am. Jur., Insurance,
Sec. 1083, which provides :
"It is a \vell settled rule of la\v that an insurer which, with knowledge of facts entitling it
to treat a policy as no longer in force, receives
and accepts a premium on the policy, it is
estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. It
cannot treat the policy as void for the purpose
of defense to an action to recover for a loss
thereafter ccurring, and at the same time treat
it as valid for the purpose of earning and collecting for the premiums." (See cases cited)
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Also, in the case of Union Assurance Soc. v. Tolivar,
141 Fed. 2d 405, the Court stated:
"An insurance company which issues policies
of insurance and accepts premiums thereon and
retains such premiums with knowledge of existing
facts, which if insisted on, would invalidate the
policies, waives conditions thereof inconsistent
with the facts so know and is estopped from
thereafter asserting such conditions in avoidance of liability." (See cases cited)
These authorities are not directly in point, but they
are analogous to the situation and show the thinking
of the courts as to the accepting and retaining premiums
\vhen the company intends to forfeit or cancel a policy.
Canal cites the case of Busby v. The North Ameri~oan
Life Ins. Co., 40 Md. 572, as analogous to the question,
but it may be distinguished on its facts. It involves a
life insurance policy that expressly provided that in
case the premium \\,.as not paid when due by the terms
of the policy, that the company would not be liable and
upon default in the payment, the policy by its terms
became a nullity. The agent exceeded his authority and
accepted future payments, but the company did not recognize them for the insured and the insurer \Yere bound
h~r the terms of th<> policy.
There vvas no such provision in the policy at hand.
The broker~ Ro~~ G. ~Tames, and the agent Stephen \V.
X etolicky, both aeeepted and retained the pre1nium,
\\,.hich \Yns ",.ithin their authority, thus Canal Insurance
Co1npany "·a~ bonnd on thP policy. See [!uion Ass1trance

22
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Soc. v. Tolivar (supra). The Drains had no reason to
apply for reinstatement, for the premium was accepted
and retained, and they had no knowledge of any cancellation notices being sent. Without the knowledge of
the true facts, the insured relied on the action of ·Canal
to their detriment, and this Court should uphold the
trial Court in finding that 'Canal Insurance Comp~any
should be estopped from asserting cancellation.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE
RESPONDENTS TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND
PRE- TRIAL ORDER TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL.

The appellants make a big "to-do" concerning the
pleading of estoppel. Respondent would first like to
point out to the Court the opening remarks of the Court
and counsel, as set forth on pages 17-18 of this brief.
The Court and counsel all realized that the question of
,\·aiver or estoppel would be a major issue in this case.
Canal cannot claim it had no opportunity to defend, for
thi:-; 'vas brought home to them at the opening of the trial.
It should be realized that estoppel in this case is a
cause of action, and not an affirmative defense, as proYided in Rule 8 (c) UR·CP. Appellants contend that
estoppel, to be a cause of aetion, must be specifically
pleaded, but the Court should be mindful of the fact
that the rule is not \vithout exceptions. An excellent
annotation on this subject is found at 120 ALR 8. There
it is stated that the majority rule on the necessity of
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pleading estoppel is that the party must specifically
plead it or waive the benefits of it, the minority rule
being that estoppel is available under the plea of the
general issue, and it is not necessary to specifically
plead it. The annotation continues further and provides exceptions to the rule, two of them being :
''A. Where there is no opportunity to plead:
"One well settled exception to the rule
requiring the pleading of estoppel or
waiver is that, if a party had no opportunity to plead estoppel or waiver, he
may give it in evidence at the trial nevertheless, with the same conclusive effect
as if it had been pleaded specially as an
estoppel. This exception applies in the
case of estoppel in pais or equitable
estoppel. * * *
"A plaintiff has no opportunity to plead
an estoppel or waiver where such a matter is not a part of his cause of action,
but the necessity of submitting evidence
thereon and relying thereon appears for
the first time in evidence submitted by
the defendant, and he was without knowledge that his demand must ultimately
rest upon such estoppel in pais, * * *
"Another circmnstance under 'vhich a
party has no opportunity to plead is
":here he has no knowledge of the facts
constituting the matter until they appear
in the evidence at the trial ; under this
circumstance he may rely on the estoppel
in pais."
24
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"B.

Where the matter appears on the face of
the pleadings :
Another exception to the rule requiring
estoppel or waiver to be specially pled
is where the estoppel appears in the adverse party's pleadings; in such cases it
need not be specially pled, where it is an
estoppel in pais, or waiver, or an estoppel
by deed, or an estoppel by prior judication. It has been held that a party may
avail himself of an estoppel in pais, although it was not specially pled as such,
if the facts constituting it are found in
the combined pleadings of the party."
120 ALR 8, 76, 82, 83, 84. (See cases
cited therein)

The respondent had no opportunity to plead estoppel, because at the time his pleadings were filed, he was
not aware of the defense of cancellation. Canal, in its
amended complaint (R. 32) provided only the following
as to cancellation:
dDefendant alleges that the policy of insurance referred to in plaintiff's amended complaint, was cancelled on or about the 24th day
of ~[ay, 1958, and the said policy was not in force
or effect on the 30th day of June, 1958, and that
by reason thereof, none of the plaintiffs is entitled to recover damages against the defendant."
He does not bother to allege that cancellation notices
were snent out. At the pre-trial ''Tas the first time any
mention "·a~ 1nade of the cancellation notices (R. 41) :
"The position of the defendant is that the
policy has been cancelled at a time prior to the
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loss by the mailing of notices of cancellation in
accordance with the provisions of the policy."
During the taking of the deposition of Mr. N etolicky,
which was after the pre-trial, the appellant introduced
a photofax copy of the cancellation notice (Exhibit 2),
and at the trial respondent objected to the admission
of this evidence and testimony ( T. 22). ·Canal could
not produce the original nor could they produce two
copies of the notices that they claimed were in their
files (T. 22, 29). At the ti1ne of the deposition, respondendt was taken by surprise, and 'yas completely unaware
that notices of this type would be introduced in evidence:
"~Ir.

Wilkinson: At the time of the deposition,
this notice was completely new to us. We had
no idea they were going to claim any notice
was sent out, it is a surprise (T. 25).

"Mr. \Vilkinson: Nothing in the pre-trial order
you were going to have a notice - going to
offer any copy of a notice; no indication at
the pre-trial there would be anything like
these offered, and at the time of the deposition
this was offered after the exhibit 2 had been
talked about -testified about, so it slipped in
'vith exhibit 2~ 'Yithout any chance being offered to object to it until after this testimony
on exhibit 2 had come in, and this had been
placed 'Yith exhibit 2, so they were offered
together.'' ( T. 25) Note: Exhibit 2, at deposition, is Exhibit 3 at the trial. T. ~9-29-A).
Even though estoppel 'Yas not specifically raised
in tltP re~pondent~' plParlings, there 'Yas sufficient basis
for the trial Court to allow eYidenee pertaining to it

26
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to be admitted. Diamond T had no opportunity or
knowledge to allege estoppel in their pleadings:
~'Appellant

invokes the general rule that, to
be available, estoppel must be pled. It was not
pled. But respondents rely upon the exception
where, not until during the trial, facts establishing the estoppel appear. If, prior to the trial, a
party has no knowledge of the facts constituting
an estoppel, he may avail himself of it when they
do evolve." (Cases cited) Pain v. Strom, 6 P2d,
849, 850.
Respondent had no opportunity to plead estoppel
as a part of their cause of action, but it was necessary
for them to rely on it and submit evidence concerning
it after appellants introduced evidence as to the cancellation notices :
''The facts which lead to the application of
the doctrine of laches and estoppel appeared
from the proof submitted by the respective parties on the trial. Under such circumstances, it
has been held by this Court that the rule of laches
and estoppel may be invoked without pleading
the same." Cases cited. Hiller est I rr. Dist. v.
Nampa & Merid1~an Irr. Dist., 66 P 2d, 115, 118.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in the case of
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Biggs, 288 P. 2d 1025, held that
estoppel could be relied on as a cause of action when it
'Yas sufficiently raised in the adverse party's pleadings.
The Court goes into a good discussion as to the exceptions
to the general rule :
"'It is urged on behalf of defendant
that there is no plea of estoppel in plaintiff's
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reply, and that, as estoppel to be availble
should be pleaded, the objection of plaintiff
cannot be sustained here. But it is also the
law that, where the matter constituting the
estoppel appears on the face of the pleading, it is not necessary to urge it by way of
a technical plea; and such is the case here.'
"That decision was announced in 1923 and
has been succeeded in law actions, as well as in
equity suits, by more than thirty years of adherence to its good sense."
The courts have held that estoppel may be sufficiently raised even though the doctrine of estoppel is
not mentioned. In the case of National AVd Life Association v. Clinton, 55 P. 2d, 781, 787, the Court stated:
"The applicable rule in this connection, as
established by this ·Court, is that if the facts constituting the estoppel are sufficiently pled, the
pleader is entitled to the benefit of the law arising
therefrom, even though the doctrine of estoppel
is not expressly mentioned in the pleadings.''
(Cases cited)
After the Court had signed the findings of fact and
conclusions of la"~, to the effect that the policy \\'"as not
in force at the time of the accident, and not previously
cancelled (R. 76), the appellant filed a motion for new
trial. At the insistence of the appellants. the Court
amended its findings of fact and conclusions of la,Y,
and specifically stated:
''The Court further finds that the defendant
is estopped fro1n claiming that the notices were
1naile<l and from claiining that the insurance
policy \\'"as cancelled." (R. 87)
28
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On the motion of the Court, the respondent was allowed to amend its pleadings to conform to the proof
adn1itted, thus prperly presenting the question before
the trial Court.
Although Canal objected to the admission of premium payments, it did so on a general objection, and not
a specific exception. At no time did it object on the
grounds of variance, and specifically bring to the attention of the trial Court that the material was not germane
to the issue, and was at variance with the issue as set
at the pre-trial.
The early Utah case of Geanakoules v. Union Portland Cement, 126 P 329, laid down the rule regarding
this:
"Furthennore, the general rule as to the
mode of making objections to the introduction
of evidence which does not correspond to the
allegatins of the pleadings, is to object to it at
the time it is offered on the grounds of a variance."
Also, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the case
of Snzith v. Brook, 47 NW 2d, 389-39-l, provides:
HWhere a party relies upon a variance between the pleadings and the proof to defend a
recovery, that question should be raised at some
time during the progress of the trial, and unless
it is so raised and suggested to the trial court,
it will not be considered on appeal."
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the pleading is even more liberal, and I refer the Court to Rules
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15 (b) and 54 (d), which I do not quote because I am
sure the Court is familiar with them, as ample authority· on this subject. The Court should recognize that
even though the respondents were the plaintiffs below,
the appellants still had the burden of proving that the
policies were cancelled, and introduction of evidence
by them necessitated the respondent bringing in evidence
to meet their proof.
Therefore, the rule, as laid down by Justice ·Crockett, in the case of Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 310 P.
2d, 517, to the effect that the adverse parties should be
given the benefit of doubt and must not be misled or
prejudiced by the introduction of new issues, would be
applieable to the respondents.

CONCLUSION
This Court should uphold the trial Court and find
that the evidence is sufficient to affirm the judgment
in favor of the respondents, and against Canal Insurance Company.
Respectfully submitted,
Harold N". ''Tilkinson
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
10 Executive Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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